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Abstract
The cost of attaining higher education is growing in some developed countries. More young
people borrow larger amounts than before to finance their higher education. Several media reports
indicate that student loans might affect young people’s decision making regarding important life
events such as marriage, childbirth, purchasing a house, and so on. Specifically, this paper focuses
on how the burden of student loans affects young people’s decision making with regard to the num-
ber of children to have, and studies the fertility rate, gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate,
and growth rate of GDP per capita using a three-period overlapping generations model. A young
agent needs to borrow to accumulate his/her human capital, although for some reason, s/he faces the
borrowing constraint. In the next period, the agent repays his/her debt as well as determines the num-
ber of children to have. Under this setting, this paper analyzes how the tightness of the borrowing
constraints affects the growth rates of the population, GDP, and GDP per capita. The paper finds
that when rearing children is time-consuming, the population growth rate decreases as the borrowing
constraints are relaxed. Moreover, the paper shows a case in which the GDP growth rate decreases
as the borrowing constraints are relaxed, whereas the growth rate of GDP per capita still increases.
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In addition, I show that if the cost of rearing children is mainly monetary, then the population growth
rate is not necessarily decreasing as the borrowing constraints are relaxed. The paper also calibrates
the model using U.S. data.
Keywords: Student loans, human capital accumulation, fertility, growth rate of GDP, growth rate of
GDP per capita, overlapping generations model
JEL Classification: E44, I25, J13, J24
1 Introduction
Developed countries such as the U.S. and Japan report that the amount of student loans to attend uni-
versities and colleges has been increasing progressively.1 Many people and the media believe that such
a heavy burden could change young people’s life styles by causing delays in marriage, leading them to
have fewer children, and so on, and that such changes affect an economy (Read, for instance, Brown and
Caldwell (2013), The New York Times (2013), The Los Angeles Times (2015), and The Wall Street
Journal (2012)). Thus, this paper constructs a three-period overlapping generations (OLG) model to
examine the effect of student loans on the population growth rate and economic growth.
The model in this paper is based on De Gregorio (1996) and Kitaura (2012). In the first period of
life, a young agent is born, and s/he accumulates human capital. To finance the cost of human capital ac-
cumulation, the young agent borrows because s/he has no wealth. The agent, however, faces a borrowing
constraint for some reason.2 The amount that the agent can borrow has an upper bound, which is exoge-
nously determined. In the second period, the middle-aged agent works, consumes, saves, repays his/her
debt, and has children. In the third period, the old agent receives the return from savings, consumes it,
and exits the economy. The agent derives utility from consumption and the number of children in his/her
1For related data, see, for instance, Lochner and Moge-Naranjo (2014).
2This paper does not discuss how the upper bound is determined endogenously, although the issue is important. As for
endogenous borrowing constraints, see, for instance, Andolfatto and Gervais (2006), de la Croix and Michel (2007), Wang
(2014), and so on.
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middle age and consumption in his/her old age.
The main question asked in this paper is how are the long-run economic growth rate and fertility
rate affected if the borrowing constraint is relaxed? As noted above, a young agent needs to borrow to
accumulate human capital. In this paper, I assume that s/he can borrow up to some ratio of labor income
in his/her middle age. Relaxing the borrowing constraint implies that the young agent can borrow more,
that is, the ratio becomes larger. Using a perfect foresight competitive equilibrium as the equilibrium
concept, I prove that it is unique and characterize a unique balanced-growth path (BGP) equilibrium. In
this unique BGP equilibrium, I investigate how the growth rates of aggregate output, output per capita,
and population change as the borrowing constraint is relaxed.
First, I show that the fertility rate, or the population growth rate, in the BGP equilibrium strictly
decreases as the borrowing constraints are relaxed until these constraints no longer bind. This paper
assumes that the cost of raising a child is time. In addition, for tractability, the utility function is assumed
to be additively separable of the natural log functions. Under this assumption, even if labor income
increases owing to accumulating human capital, because the income effect and the substitution effect
are cancelled out, economic growth does not affect the number of children a middle-aged agent has. As
the borrowing constraints are relaxed, however, the repayment that the middle-aged agent has to make
increases, and thus, the agent will have a smaller number of children as the borrowing constraints are
relaxed. If the cost of rearing children is assumed to be monetary rather than time, relaxing borrowing
constraints does not necessarily decrease the fertility rate. Since relaxing borrowing constraints increases
human capital accumulation and stimulates economic growth, as long as a child is a normal good, the
middle-aged agent will have more children. This suggests that lending young agents more will reduce
the fertility rate if raising children is time-consuming rather than goods-consuming.
Second, I examine how the gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate in the BGP equilibrium
changes if the borrowing constraints are relaxed. The size of the GDP growth rate in the BGP equi-
librium is determined by the growth rates of human capital and the population. Since the population
growth rate decreases as the borrowing constraints are relaxed, relaxing these constraints slows down the
GDP growth rate. The growth rate of human capital depends on the tightness of the borrowing constraints
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and capital per effective unit of labor through the labor wage and interest rate. Since a young agent can
borrow more, s/he can accumulate more human capital. Thus, relaxing the borrowing constraints raises
the GDP growth rate. On the other hand, if the young agent borrows more in the capital market, the sup-
ply of physical capital decreases, which increases the interest rate. At the same time, more human capital
stock reduces the marginal product of the effective unit of labor, which leads to a decrease in labor wage.
Since a young agent has to repay the debt in the next period from his/her labor income, higher interest
rate and lower labor wage are disincentives against accumulating human capital for young agents. Thus,
the growth rate of human capital in the BGP equilibrium will increase as the borrowing constraints are
relaxed up to some point, and it will start decreasing as they are relaxed. Combining the effects of the
population and human capital growth rates gives us a GDP growth rate that is hump-shaped in the degree
of tightness of the borrowing constraints. Kitaura (2012) derived the same result in the setting where the
population growth rate is exogenously given and constant.
Lastly, I investigate how the growth rate of GDP per capita will be affected if the borrowing con-
straints are relaxed. Since the growth rate of GDP per capita is GDP growth rate divided by the popu-
lation growth rate, the growth rate of GDP per capita will increase up to some point as the borrowing
constraints are relaxed, and will thereafter start decreasing with further relaxation of the constraints. In
this paper’s setting, I clarify the relationship between the GDP growth rate and growth rate of GDP per
capita. I show that the peak of the GDP growth rate appears to the left of the peak of the growth rate of
GDP per capita. This implies three possible cases, depending on parameter values.3 In the first case, both
growth rates are increasing as the borrowing constraints are relaxed. In the second case, both growth rates
are increasing as the borrowing constraints are relaxed, and only the GDP growth rate starts decreasing
after some point. In the third case, both growth rates increase as the borrowing constraints are relaxed,
and the GDP growth rate starts decreasing, and later, the growth rate of GDP per capita also starts de-
creasing. The most interesting case might be the second one. Jappelli and Pagano (1994) were the first
to examine the effect of the borrowing constraint to economic growth. Since they did not consider human
3If the borrowing constraints are too relaxed, then both growth rates stay constant.
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capital accumulation, borrowing more reduces the amount of capital formation, which affects economic
growth negatively. De Gregorio (1996) pointed out the possibility that if an agent can borrow more and
thus accumulate more human capital, then relaxing the borrowing constraint affects economic growth
positively. Since De Gregorio (1996) considered a small open economy, the effects of the changes of
the factor prices in factor markets were ignored, and it is possible that the results of De Gregorio (1996)
might differ in a closed economy setting. Kitaura (2012) examined the same question as De Gregorio
(1996) in a closed economy, and he showed that the GDP growth rate is not necessarily increasing as the
borrowing constraints are relaxed, which is in disagreement with De Gregorio (1996). More precisely,
he showed a case in which the GDP growth rate increases up to some point as the borrowing constraints
are relaxed and starts decreasing after this point. In all of the above-mentioned papers, the population
growth rate is exogenously given and constant. Thus, the growth rates of the GDP and GDP per capita
are the same. The second case shows the possibility that even though GDP growth rate decreases as the
borrowing constraints are relaxed, the growth rate of GDP per capita increases.
In addition to theoretical analysis, although the model is very simple, I calibrate the model under
parameter values that describe the U.S. economy. The model suggests that relaxing the borrowing con-
straints can increase both the GDP growth rate and the growth rate of GDP per capita, and only the
GDP growth rate starts decreasing after some point. Of course, the population growth rate decreases by
relaxing the borrowing constraints.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the economic model, and
Section 3 characterizes the BGP equilibrium. In Section 4, comparative statics is conducted, and Section
5 provides a numerical simulation. Section 6 discusses the case in which the cost of rearing children is
monetary. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Model
Time is discrete and continues forever; t = 1,2, . . . . An agent lives for three periods: young, middle,
and old. Thus, in each period t, three generations coexist. If an agent is young in period, say, t−1, s/he
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decides the educational expenditure, et−1, to accumulate his/her human capital. Suppose that a young
agent finances educational expenditure by borrowing. Thus, s/he will borrow et−1 in period t−1 in the
imperfect capital market. An agent who borrows et−1 in period t− 1 has to repay the debt in the next
period with (gross) interest rate rt . The imperfectness of the capital market is described by the borrowing
constraint. Formally, a young agent faces the borrowing constraint,
et−1rt ≤ µwtht , (1)
where µ ∈ (0,1]. In some sense, this µ reflects how frequently young agents default. If µ is low, it means
that because young agents default so often, middle agents cannot lend too much. If a young agent spends
et−1 for human capital accumulation in period t−1, his/her human capital in period t will be
ht = θeηt−1h
1−η
t−1 , (2)
where θ > 0 and η ∈ (0,1).
A middle agent in period t is endowed with one unit of time. S/he divides one unit of time between
working and rearing children. To raise one child, a middle agent has to spend φ > 0 units of time. If
a middle agent has nt children, then the time cost for rearing them is φnt . I assume that this time cost
does not help a young agent accumulate his/her human capital at all. Letting wt be a real wage, a middle
agent with human capital ht will receive the effective labor income, wtht . Then, the budget constraint for
a middle agent is
ct + st + et−1rt ≤ (1−φnt)wtht , (3)
where ct is the consumption, and st is the savings. When an agent becomes old, s/he retires and consumes
dt+1 with interest income, rt+1st . Thus, the budget constraint for an old agent is
dt+1 ≤ rt+1st . (4)
Assume that s0 > 0, e0 > 0, and h0 > 0 are given exogenously. From Equations (3) and (4), the lifetime
budget constraint is
ct +
dt+1
rt+1
+ et−1rt ≤ (1−φnt)wtht . (5)
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Let Nt be the population of middle agents in period t. If the middle agents in period t have nt children,
then the population of the middle agents in period t+1 is
Nt+1 = ntNt .
Assume that N0 > 0 and n0 > 0 are given exogenously.
An agent derives utility from consumption and the number of children when s/he is middle-aged, and
from consumption when s/he is old. Hence, an agent’s lifetime utility is expressed by
U(ct ,dt+1,nt) := ln(ct)+ γ ln(nt)+β ln(dt+1),
where β > 0 and γ > 0 stand for the preference strength relative to the consumption when the agent is
middle-aged.
There is a representative firm in the economy. Its production function is expressed as
Yt = AF(Kt ,Lt) := AKαt L
1−α
t ,
where α ∈ (0,1), and Kt and Lt are the aggregate capital stock and aggregate effective labor in the
economy, respectively. Given the real wage, wt , and the real rental rate of capital, rt , the firm’s profit in
period t is
AKαt L
1−α
t − rtKt −wtLt .
I assume that capital is fully depreciated after production. Let kt := Kt/Lt denote capital per effective
unit of labor in period t.
2.1 Equilibrium
The equilibrium concept is a standard perfect foresight competitive equilibrium. The formal definition is
as follows.
Definition 2.1. Given N0 > 0, n0 > 0, s0 > 0, e0 > 0, and h0 > 0, an equilibrium consists of a consump-
tion sequence, (d1,(ct ,dt+1)∞t=1); a sequence of fertility, (nt)
∞
t=1; a sequence of educational expenditure,
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(et)∞t=1; a sequence of savings, (st)
∞
t=1; a sequence of inputs for production, (Kt ,Lt)
∞
t=1; and a sequence
of prices (wt ,rt)∞t=1 such that
1. given the prices, a middle-aged agent solves
maxct ,et−1,nt ,dt+1 ln(ct)+ γ ln(nt)+β ln(dt+1)
s.t. ct +
dt+1
rt+1
+ et−1rt ≤ (1−φnt)wtht ,
ht = θeηt−1h
1−η
t−1 ,
et−1rt ≤ µwtht .
2. Given prices (w1,r2), e0 > 0, and h0 > 0, the initial middle-aged agent solves
maxc1,n1,d2 ln(c1)+ γ ln(n1)+β ln(d2)
s.t. c1+
d2
r2
+ e0r1 ≤ (1−φn1)w1h1,
h1 = θeη0 h
1−η
0 .
3. For the initial old agent, d1 = r1s0.
4. The firm maximizes its profit in each period such that
wt = (1−α)Akαt , rt = αAkα−1t .
5. A capital market and a labor market clear in each period: For all t, Kt = Nt−1st−1−Ntet−1 and
Lt = Nt(1−φnt)ht , where Nt = nt−1Nt−1 and ht = θeηt−1h1−ηt−1 are satisfied.
A BGP equilibrium is an equilibrium such that for some g> 0, Yt+1Yt =
Kt+1
Kt
= Lt+1Lt = g for all t.
3 Characterizing equilibrium
The first-order conditions to a young agent’s problem induce
dt+1 = β rt+1ct , (6)
φntwtht = γct . (7)
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Letting λ1 and λ2 be the Lagrange multipliers for (5) and (1), respectively, another first-order condition
is
−λ1
[
rt − (1−φnt)wtθηeη−1t−1 h1−ηt−1
]
= λ2
[
rt −µwtθηeη−1t−1 h1−ηt−1
]
. (8)
3.1 Borrowing constraints do not bind
Consider an equilibrium where the borrowing constraints do not bind. That is, λ2 = 0. Since λ1 > 0,
from Equation (8),
rt = (1−φnt)wtθηeη−1t−1 h1−ηt−1 (9)
holds. From this equation,
rtet−1 = η(1−φnt)wtht (10)
holds. Using Equations (5), (6), (7), and (10),
ct =
1−η
1+β + γ(1−η)wtht
holds. From this,
nt = nnb :=
γ(1−η)
φ [1+β + γ(1−η)]
holds, where the superscript “nb” stands for “not bind.” Note that the fertility rate is constant over time.
Plugging nt into Equation (9),
et−1 =
[
θη(1+β )
1+β + γ(1−η)
wt
rt
] 1
1−η
ht−1 (11)
holds.
From the law of motion of human capital, in this case,
ht
ht−1
= θ
[
θη(1+β )
1+β + γ(1−η)
1−α
α
kt
] η
1−η
(12)
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is satisfied, where I use equilibrium conditions wt = A(1−α)kαt and rt = Aαkα−1t .
From the market clearing condition,
kt+1 =
Kt+1
Lt+1
=
Ntst −Nt+1et
Nt+1(1−φnt+1)ht+1 =
st
nt(1−φnt+1)ht+1 −
et
(1−φnt+1)ht+1 .
The amount of savings is
st =
dt+1
rt+1
= βct =
β (1−η)
1+β + γ(1−η)wtht .
Thus,
kt+1 =
β (1−η)A(1−α)kαt
1+β + γ(1−η)
1
nnb(1−φnnb)
ht
ht+1
− 1
1−φnnb
[
θη(1+β )
1+β + γ(1−η)
1−α
α
kt+1
] 1
1−η ht
ht+1
.
Applying Equation (12) to this equation,
kt+1θ
[
θη(1+β )
1+β + γ(1−η)
1−α
α
kt+1
] η
1−η
=
β (1−η)A(1−α)kαt
1+β + γ(1−η)
1
nnb(1−φnnb)
− 1
1−φnnb
[
θη(1+β )
1+β + γ(1−η)
1−α
α
kt+1
] 1
1−η
.
After rearranging this equation, I obtain
kt+1 =
1
θ
(
η(1+β )
1+β+γ(1−η)
1−α
α
)η [α+η(1−α)
α
]1−η [β (1−η)A(1−α)1+β + γ(1−η) 1nnb(1−φnnb)
]1−η
kα(1−η)t .
This gives us a unique, globally stable steady state, k, which is characterized by
k
nb
:=
 1
θ
(
η(1+β )
1+β+γ(1−η)
1−α
α
)η [α+(1−α)η
α
]1−η [β (1−η)A(1−α)1+β + γ(1−η) 1nnb(1−φnnb)
]1−η
1
1−α(1−η)
.
From Equation (12), the growth rate of human capital in the long-run equilibrium is
ĝnb :=
ht+1
ht
= Znb
(
η
1+β + γ(1−η)
) η(1−α)
1−α(1−η)
[
1+β + γ(1−η)
α+η(1−α)
] η
1−α(1−η)
,
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where Znb := θ
1−α
1−α(1−η)
(1−α
α
) η(1−α)
1−α(1−η)
[
βA(1−α)αφ
γ(1+β )α
] η
1−α(1−η) . Note that the growth rate of aggregate output
is Yt+1Yt =
(
Kt+1
Kt
)α (Lt+1
Lt
)1−α
=
(
kt+1
kt
)α (
(1−φnt+1)Nt+1ht+1
(1−φnt)Ntht
)
. Hence, the growth rate of aggregate output
in the BGP equilibrium, gnb, is
gnb = nnbĝnb = Ẑnb
1−η
1+β + γ(1−η)
(
η
1+β + γ(1−η)
) η(1−α)
1−α(1−η)
[
1+β + γ(1−η)
α+η(1−α)
] η
1−α(1−η)
,
where Ẑnb := Znb γφ . Let yt be output per capita, that is, yt :=
Yt
Nt−1+Nt+Nt+1 . In the BGP equilibrium, the
growth rate of output per capita is
yt+1
yt
=
Yt+1
Yt
Nt−1+Nt +Nt+1
Nt +Nt+1+Nt+2
=
gnb
nnb
= ĝnb.
3.2 Borrowing constraints bind
When borrowing constraints bind, λ2 > 0. From the borrowing constraint,
et−1 = µ
wt
rt
ht = µ
1−α
α
ktht = µ
1−α
α
ktθeηt−1h
1−η
t−1 .
Thus,
et−1 =
[
µθ
1−α
α
kt
] 1
1−η
ht−1. (13)
From Equations (5), (6), and (7),
ct =
(1−µ)wtht
1+β + γ
.
From Equation (7), the fertility rate is
nt = nb :=
γ(1−µ)
φ(1+β + γ)
,
where the superscript “b” stands for “binds.” From the law of motion of human capital and Equation
(13),
ht
ht−1
= θ
[
µθ(1−α)
α
kt
] η
1−η
.
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When do borrowing constraints bind? The borrowing constraints bind if and only if et−1, defined by
Equation (13), is smaller than et−1, defined by Equation (11), that is,[
µθ
1−α
α
kt
] 1
1−η
ht−1 <
[
θη(1+β )
1+β + γ(1−η)
1−α
α
kt
] 1
1−η
ht−1
holds. Thus, the borrowing constraints bind if and only if
µ < µ :=
η(1+β )
1+β + γ(1−η) .
Lemma 3.1. (i) µ is strictly increasing in β and strictly decreasing in γ . (ii) µ is strictly increasing in
η , and µ is 0 when η = 0 and 1 when η = 1.
Proof. See the Appendix. Q.E.D.
Intuitively, if the utility from children is relatively more important compared to the utility from
consumption in the middle and old periods, an agent will want to have more children when s/he is
middle-aged. Since the agent has to spend time on rearing children, time for work is reduced. Thus, the
return from investing human capital becomes lower, and the agent invests less if γ is larger. This implies
that even if the borrowing constraint is relaxed, it may not affect an agent’s human capital investment
at all when the utility weight on having children is relatively large compared to that on consumption in
the middle and old periods. When η is large, the return from human capital investment is large. Thus,
an agent has an incentive to invest in his/her human capital more if η is large. This implies that the
borrowing constraint binds frequently.
The amount of savings is
st =
dt+1
rt+1
= βct =
β (1−µ)
1+β + γ
wtht .
Since kt+1 = stnt(1−φnt+1)ht+1 −
et
(1−φnt+1)ht+1 , using the algebra analogous to the previous “not binding” case
gives us
kt+1 =
 βA(1−α)φγ[
µθ(1−α)
α
] η
1−η θ (1+β )[α+µ(1−α)]+γµα(1+β+γ)

1−η
kα(1−η)t .
12
From this, the steady-state capital per effective unit of labor is
k
b
:=
 βA(1−α)φγ[
µθ(1−α)
α
] η
1−η θ (1+β )[α+µ(1−α)]+γµα(1+β+γ)

1−η
1−α(1−η)
.
Thus, the growth rate of human capital in the BGP equilibrium is
ĝb :=
ht+1
ht
= θ
[
µθ(1−α)
α
k
b
] η
1−η
= Zb
[
µ1−α
(1+β )α+µ[(1+β )(1−α)+ γ]
] η
1−α(1−η)
,
where Zb := θ
1−α
1−α(1−η)
(1−α
α
) η(1−α)
1−α(1−η)
(
βA(1−α)φα(1+β+γ)
γ
) η
1−α(1−η) . Notice that this growth rate is equiva-
lent to the growth rate of output per capita.
From this, the growth rate in the BGP equilibrium is
gb = nbĝb = Ẑb(1−µ)
[
µ1−α
(1+β )α+µ[(1−α)(1+β )+ γ]
] η
1−α(1−η)
,
where Ẑb := Zb γφ(1+β+γ) .
4 Results
The first result concerns the fertility rate.
Proposition 4.1. The population growth rate, or the fertility rate, in the BGP equilibrium is decreasing
in µ when µ < µ̂ and is constant in µ when µ ≥ µ̂ .
Proof. See the Appendix. Q.E.D.
As shown in this result, the fertility rate decreases as the borrowing constraint relaxes. I later show
that the economy will grow as µ increases. Although the economy grows, the fertility rate shrinks.
Furthermore, the main reason for this reduction of the fertility rate is the burden of student loan. Because
the income effect and substitution effect are cancelled out in this example economy, an increase in wage
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due to economic growth does not affect the fertility rate at all. Thus, this decrease in the fertility rate is
purely due to the burden of the student loan.
The second result concerns the aggregate output growth rate. Recall that when µ ≥ µ , the output
growth rate is constant at gnb.
Proposition 4.2. There exists a unique µ˜ ∈ (0,1) such that
dgb
dµ

>
=
<
0 if µ

<
=
>
 µ˜.
Proof. See the Appendix. Q.E.D.
When µ˜ ≤ µ , the growth rate of Y in the BGP equilibrium is increasing in µ up to µ˜ , decreasing in µ
for µ ∈ (µ˜,µ), and constant in µ for µ ≥ µ . When µ˜ > µ , the growth rate ofY is increasing in µ up to µ ,
and constant in µ for µ ≥ µ . An increase in µ raises human capital accumulation, which has a positive
effect on economic growth. At the same time, however, an increase in µ decreases the population and
amount of physical capital stock, which has a negative effect on economic growth. When µ is small,
the first positive effect dominates the second negative effect, whereas as µ becomes large, the first effect
disappears and the economic growth rate becomes smaller. This finding is in agreement with the result
of Kitaura (2012), who assumed the population growth rate is constant.
With Lemma 3.1, I show that there exists a unique η˜ ∈ (0,1) such that µ(η˜) = µ˜ . In summary,
Remark 4.1. there exists a unique η˜ ∈ (0,1) such that (i) if η ≤ η˜ , then the growth rate of Y is increasing
in µ up to µ and stays constant in µ for µ ≥ µ , (ii) if η > η˜ , then the growth rate of Y is increasing in
µ up to µ˜ , decreasing in µ for µ ∈ (µ˜,µ), and stays constant in µ for µ ≥ µ .
The third result relates to the growth rate of output per capita. Let y be the output per capita. Note
again that when µ ≥ µ , the growth rate of y is constant in µ .
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Proposition 4.3. Letting µ̂ := (1−α)(1+β )(1+β )(1−α)+γ ,
dĝb
dµ

>
=
<
0 if µ

<
=
>
 µ̂.
Proof. See the Appendix. Q.E.D.
When µ̂ ≤ µ , the output growth rate of y in the BGP equilibrium is increasing in µ up to µ̂ , decreasing
in µ for µ ∈ (µ̂,µ), and constant in µ for µ > µ . When µ̂ > µ , the output growth rate of y is increasing
in µ up to µ , and stays constant in µ for µ > µ , which is quite similar to the growth rate of Y . However,
the cutoff levels of µ (µ˜ and µ̂) are different for the two growth rates. It can be shown that µ˜ < µ̂ .
Lemma 4.1. 0< µ˜ < µ̂ < 1.
Proof. See the Appendix. Q.E.D.
By Lemma 3.1, there exists a unique η̂ ∈ (0,1) such that µ(η̂) = µ̂ . Since µ(η) is strictly increasing,
Lemma 4.1 implies that η˜ < η̂ .
Proposition 4.4. (i) If η ≤ η˜ , then the growth rates of both Y and y are strictly increasing in µ up
to µ , and stay constant in µ for µ > µ . (ii) If η ∈ (η˜ , η̂ ], then the growth rates of both Y and y are
strictly increasing in µ up to µ˜ , while the growth rate of Y is strictly decreasing and that of y is strictly
increasing in µ for µ ∈ (µ˜,µ). Further, both growth rates stay constant in µ for µ > µ . (iii) If η > η̂ ,
then the growth rate of both Y and y are strictly increasing in µ up to µ˜ , the growth rate of Y is strictly
decreasing and that of y is strictly increasing in µ for µ ∈ (µ˜,µ), and both growth rates stay constant in
µ for µ > µ .
When η is small, the effects of the borrowing constraints on the growth rates of Y and on y are the
same, that is, they are strictly increasing in µ up to µ and stay constant after that. When η is high, both
growth rates are hump-shaped in µ , while the µs for the highest growth rates are different. The most
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interesting case might be that of η taking a medium value. When this happens, the growth rate of Y is
hump-shaped in µ , whereas the growth rate of y is strictly increasing in µ . This implies that although
the aggregate output grows slowly when the borrowing constraint relaxes, the output per capita grows
quickly. This possibility is ignored in the literature (e.g., De Gregorio (1996) and Kitaura (2012)). De
Gregorio (1996) argued that an increase in µ raises the growth rate of Y , and Kitaura (2012) argued that
if factor prices are determined by the markets, the argument in De Gregorio (1996) is not necessarily
true. In the literature, the (net) population growth rate is 0. Thus, the growth rates of aggregate output and
output per capita are the same in past studies. This paper, however, shows that if the population growth
rate is endogenously determined, the manner in which the borrowing constraint affects the growth rates
of Y and y is not necessarily consistent.
5 Numerical simulation
This section calibrates the model using appropriate parameter values. Following Zˇamac (2007), I set
β at (0.98)27, α = 13 , A = 21.6, θ = 1, and η = 0.16. Following de la Croix and Doepke (2003), I
assume that the weight on fertility relative to consumption for the young (γ) is 0.271. The time cost for
rearing a child, φ , is set at 0.089. According to the American Time Use Survey, in 2014,4 when both
spouses worked full time, on average, mothers and fathers spent 5.21 hours and 6.06 hours for “working
and work-related activities,” respectively, and mothers and fathers spent 1.35 hours and 0.88 hours over
“caring for and helping household children,” respectively, in a day. In addition, according to the United
States Census Bureau, in 2014, the average number of own children under 18 in families was 1.87.5
Thus, we can consider that each household spends at least 1.35+0.901.87 = 1.2085 hours to raise one child. In
this numerical simulation, an agent in the model is regarded as a household. Since a household splits 1
unit of time between work and child-rearing, φ should be set at 1.208511.27+2.26 ≈ 0.089.
Under these parameter values, µ = 0.1311 and µ̂ = 0.7974. In addition, the growth rate of Y is
4See http://www.bls.gov/tus/tables/a7 0913.htm.
5See http://www.census.gov/hhes/families/data/cps2014AVG.html.
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maximized at µ˜ = 0.0913. The growth rate of Y is plotted as a solid line and that of y is plotted as a
dashed line with dots in Figure 1. As Proposition 4.4 shows, the growth rate of Y is hump-shaped in µ ,
whereas that of y is increasing in µ , both of which are observed in Figure 1. Figure 2 shows how the
fertility rate changes in µ . Using U.S. population data provided by the World Bank, the average annual
population growth rate between 1960 and 2014 is 1.016. Hence, the population growth rate over 27 years
is around 1.5351. In this simulation, the fertility rate or population growth rate is 1.5351 when µ is about
0.065. Since 0.065 < 0.0913 = µ˜ < 0.1311 = µ < 0.7974 = µ̂ , relaxing the borrowing constraint can
simultaneously increase the growth rates of Y and y, although the population growth rate shrinks.
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Figure 1: Growth rates of Y and y for different µ
6 Monetary cost of child-rearing
Raising a child needs not only a parent’s time but also money. Several researchers such as Boldrin and
Jones (2002), Fanti and Gori (2012), and Miyazaki (2013) considered both time cost and monetary cost
to analyze the model. So far, this paper only focuses on the time cost of child-rearing, and this setting
is necessary to derive Proposition 4.1, that is, the fertility rate is decreasing as the borrowing constraints
are relaxed. In this section, I briefly discuss how the results will change if I use the monetary cost of
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Figure 2: Fertility rate for different µ
rearing a child instead of the time cost.
Letting ψ be the monetary cost of raising one child, the lifetime budget constraint, Equation (5), is
rewritten as
ct +
dt+1
rt+1
+ψnt + rtet−1 ≤ wtht . (14)
The other parts do not change. The first-order conditions to an agent’s problem are
dt+1 = β rt+1ct , (15)
ψnt = γct , (16)
−λ1
[
rt −wtθηeη−1t−1 h1−ηt−1
]
= λ2
[
rt −µwtθηeη−1t−1 h1−ηt−1
]
. (17)
6.1 Borrowing constraints do not bind
In this case, λ2 = 0. Thus, from Equation (17),
et−1 =
(
θηwt
rt
) 1
1−η
ht−1. (18)
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Analogous to Section 3, I have
ct =
1
1+β + γ
(
θηwt
rt
) 1
1−η
(
1
η
−1
)
ht−1rt , (19)
nt =
γ
ψ(1+β + γ)
(
θηwt
rt
) 1
1−η
(
1
η
−1
)
ht−1rt , (20)
st =
β
1+β + γ
(
θηwt
rt
) 1
1−η
(
1
η
−1
)
ht−1rt . (21)
From the capital market clearing condition, I get
kt+1 =
st
ntht+1
− et
ht+1
=
βψ
γθeηt h
1−η
t
− (1−α)η
α
kt+1,
where I replace wt and rt by A(1−α)kαt and Aαkα−1t , respectively. From this,
kt+1 =
βψ
γ
[
1+ 1−αα η
]
ht+1
. (22)
From the formulation of human capital and Equation (2), in equilibrium,
ht+1 = θ
(
θηwt+1
rt+1
) η
1−η
ht = θ
(
θη(1−α)
α
) η
1−η
k
η
1−η
t+1 ht .
Plugging Equation (22) into this equation, I get
ht+1 = θ 1−η
(
θη(1−α)
α
)η βψ
γ
[
1+ (1−α)ηα
]
η h1−ηt . (23)
From this equation and Equation (22), there is a unique BGP equilibrium, and the GDP growth rate in
the BGP equilibrium is
Yt+1
Yt
=
(
Kt+1
Kt
)α(Nt+1ht+1
Ntht
)1−α
=
(
kt+1
kt
)α Nt+1ht+1
Ntht
= nt := n, (24)
where n is derived from Equations (16), (22), and (23). Thus, the growth rate of GDP per capita in the
BGP equilibrium is 1.
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6.2 Borrowing constraints bind
Following the same process used in the previous section,
kt+1 =
βψ
γ
[
1+ θµ(1−α)α
]
ht+1
, (25)
ht+1 = θ 1−η
(
θµ(1−α)
α
)η( βψα
γ[α+µθ(1−α)]
)η
h1−ηt (26)
are derived. Again, there is a unique BGP equilibrium. In the BGP equilibrium, the fertility rate is
nb := M
(
1
α+µθ(1−α)
) η+α(1−η)
1−η
(1−µ)µ η1−η
[
µ
α+θµ(1−α)
]1−α− η1−η
= M
(1−µ)µ1−α
α+µθ(1−α) , (27)
where M := γθ(1−α)ψ(1+β+γ)
(
θ(1−α)
α
) η
1−η
(
αβψ
γ
) η+α(1−η)
1−η
[
θ
1
η βψ(1−α)
γ
]1−α− η1−η
. The borrowing constraints
bind if and only if µ ≤ η , which is the same as in Kitaura (2012). Note again that the GDP growth
rate in the BGP equilibrium is nb.
Proposition 6.1. There exists a unique µ̂ ∈ (0,1) such that
dnb
dµ

>
=
<
0 if µ

<
=
>
 µ̂.
Proof. See the Appendix. Q.E.D.
From this Proposition, the GDP growth rate is also hump-shaped in µ , and the growth rate of GDP
per capita is constant at 1.
Since the analysis is too complicated if both the time cost and the monetary cost are combined, I
analyze the two cases separately. However, it is fair to say that if the monetary cost is more crucial for
raising children than the time cost, then we will obtain results similar to those in this section; otherwise,
we will see a pattern similar to that in Section 4.
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7 Concluding remarks
This paper considers a three-period OLG model in which a young agent faces a borrowing constraint
against human capital accumulation, and a middle-aged agent determines the fertility rate endogenously.
The main purpose of this paper is to examine how the borrowing constraints affect the growth rates of the
population, GDP, and GDP per capita on a BGP equilibrium. The paper’s results show that the fertility
rate declines as the borrowing of young agents increases, which has been a growing concern in some
developed countries such as the U.S., Japan, and so on. Furthermore, the paper showed a case where the
GDP growth rate decreases as the borrowing constraints are relaxed, whereas the growth rate of GDP per
capita increases. Thus, relaxing the borrowing constraints may not be as detrimental as indicated by the
previous literature, for example, Kitaura (2012).
Although the huge burden of student loans is becoming an important issue in terms of the future
economy, to the best of my knowledge, there is little research on this matter. This paper assumes ho-
mogeneous agents, and hence, all young agents had to borrow. This is quite an extreme assumption,
because not all people need to borrow to go to college or university. One possible extension of this paper
is to consider agents with different wealth levels and examine how the borrowing constraints affect the
economy in such cases.
A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 3.1
Proof. (i) µ can be rewritten as 11
η+
γ(1−η)
η(1+β )
. As β increases, the denominator strictly decreases. Thus, µ is
strictly increasing in β . Since the denominator of µ is increasing in γ , µ is strictly decreasing in γ . (ii)
Since the numerator of µ is strictly increasing in η and its denominator is strictly decreasing in η , µ is
strictly increasing in η . Plugging η = 0 and η = 1 into µ proves the latter result. Q.E.D.
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A.2 Proof of Proposition 4.1
Proof. When µ < µ̂ , the borrowing constraint binds. Thus, the population growth rate is nb = γ(1−µ)φ(1+β+γ) .
It is not difficult to check dn
b
dµ < 0. When µ ≥ µ̂ , the borrowing constraint does not bind anymore. Hence,
the population growth rate is nnb = γ(1−η)φ [1+β+γ(1−η)] . This does not depend on µ . Q.E.D.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 4.2
Proof. Since I want to know how gb changes as µ changes, I take the derivative of g
b
Ẑb
with respect to µ .
d
(
gb
Ẑb
)
dµ
= −Q η1−α(1−η) + (1−µ)η
1−α(1−η)Q
η
1−α(1−η)−1 (1−α)(1+β )αµ−α −αµ1−α [(1−α)(1+β )+ γ]
{(1+β )α+µ[(1−α)(1+β )+ γ]}2 ,
where Q := µ
1−α
(1+β )α+µ[(1−α)(1+β )+γ] . The sign of this is equivalent to the sign of
− µ
1−α
(1+β )α+µ[(1−α)(1+β )+ γ] +
(1−µ)η
1−α(1−η)
(1−α)(1+β )αµ−α −αµ1−α [(1−α)(1+β )+ γ]
{(1+β )α+µ[(1−α)(1+β )+ γ]}2 .
Moreover, the sign of this is equivalent to the sign of
m(µ) := −(1−α)[(1−α)(1+β )+ γ]µ2
−α {[1−α(1−η)](1+β )+η(1−α)(1+β )+η [(1−α)(1+β )+ γ]}µ+η(1−α)(1+β )α.
The function m is hump-shaped, satisfies m(0) > 0, and takes the maximum at some m˜ < 0. Note that
m(1) =−(1−α)[(1−α)(1+β )+ γ]−α {[1−α(1−η)](1+β )+η(1−α)(1+β )+ηγ}< 0. Thus,
there exists a unique µ˜ ∈ (0,1) such that dgbdµ > (<)0 for µ < (>)µ˜ . Q.E.D.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 4.3
Proof. To know the sign of dĝ
b
dµ , I focus on how
µ1−α
(1+β )α+µ[(1+β )(1−α)+γ] changes with µ . Taking the
derivative of µ
1−α
(1+β )α+µ[(1+β )(1−α)+γ] with respect to µ , I obtain
(1−α)µ−α
(1+β )α+µ[(1+β )(1−α)+ γ] −
µ1−α [(1+β )(1−α)+ γ]
{(1+β )α+µ[(1+β )(1−α)+ γ]}2
=
µ−αα
{(1+β )α+µ[(1+β )(1−α)+ γ]}2 [(1−α)(1+β )−{(1−α)(1+β )+ γ}µ] .
22
Hence, if µ < µ̂ = (1−α)(1+β )(1−α)(1+β )+γ ,
dĝb
dµ > 0. Q.E.D.
A.5 Proof of Lemma 4.1
Proof. Plugging µ̂ into m(µ), I have
m(µ̂) =−(1−α)[(1−α)(1+β )+ γ]µ̂2−α {[1−α(1−η)](1+β )+η(1−α)(1+β )} µ̂ < 0.
Since m(µ˜) = 0 and m(µ)< 0 for any µ > µ˜ , µ˜ < µ̂ . Q.E.D.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 6.1
Proof. Taking the derivative of nb with respect to µ , I have
dnb
dµ
=
Mµ−α
[α+µθ(1−α)]2Q(µ),
where Q(µ) := −θ(1−α)2µ2−α[1+(1−α)(1+θ)]µ +α(1−α). Note that Q(0) = α(1−α) > 0
and Q(1) = −θ(1−α)−α(1−α)(1+θ)−α2 < 0. In addition, Q(µ) reaches its maximum at some
negative µ . Thus, there exists a unique µ̂ ∈ (0,1) such thatQ(µ)> 0 for µ < µ̂ , Q(µ̂) = 0, andQ(µ)< 0
for µ > µ̂ . This completes the proof. Q.E.D.
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